Cost-of-Completion versus Diminution-of-Value Damages for Deliberate Breach: An Economic Analysis
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 173, Heft 1, S. 18
ISSN: 1614-0559
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In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 173, Heft 1, S. 18
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 170, Heft 1, S. 24
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 169, Heft 1, S. 26
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 164, Heft 1, S. 44
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 163, Heft 4, S. 531
ISSN: 1614-0559
In: Institute for the Study of Labor Discussion Paper No. 2367
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In: CESifo Working Paper No. 9825
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In: Journal of economic dynamics & control, Band 134, S. 104288
ISSN: 0165-1889
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7673
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In: Bielefeld Working Papers in Economics and Management
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4698
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3786
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In: The Rand journal of economics, Band 42, Heft 4, S. 639-663
ISSN: 1756-2171
We study location games where market entry is costly and occurs sequentially, and where consumers are nonuniformly distributed over the unit interval. We show that for certain classes of densities, including monotone and—under some additional restrictions—hump‐shaped and U‐shaped ones, equilibrium locations can be determined independently of when they are occupied. Our analysis reveals a number of peculiarities of the uniform distribution. Extensions of the model allow for price competition and advertisement in media markets, winner‐take‐all competition, trade‐offs between profits in the short and the long run, and firms operating multiple outlets.
In: Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Band 67, Heft 3-4, S. 820-831
This paper shows that monitoring a partner too much in the initial phase of a relationship may not be optimal if the goal is to determine his loyalty to the match and if the cost of ending the relationship increases over time. The intuition is simple: by monitoring too much we learn less about how the partner will behave when he is not monitored. Only by giving to the partner the possibility to mis-behave might he be tempted to do it, and only in this case is there a chance to learn his type at a time where separation would be possible at a relatively low cost.
We consider Hotelling location games with global and local players. Global players are active in several markets, while local players act in a single market only. The decisive feature is that global players cannot tailor their product to each market but have to choose a location on the Hotelling line that is valid for all markets in which they are active. Obvious examples include the media industry and politics, where competitors typically compete in several markets with basically the same product. We determine equilibrium configurations for simple specifications of such games. We then show that the presence of global players tends to induce lower product diversity across markets. Finally, when the number of firms is endogenous, we show how global players may use their location choice as a preemptive device.
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